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Abstract 
New Zealand has extensive infrastructure networks and localised, dense urban 
populations that make it vulnerable to natural disasters. When they occur, the 
effects can be devastating on the natural and built environment. Organisations 
therefore need to be well prepared, rather than rely on a reactive recovery 
process after an event.  
As one aspect of a major programme of research in New Zealand, the authors 
address the recovery issue in terms of how the local legislative and regulatory 
frameworks either facilitate or hinder reconstruction projects and 
programmes. If well articulated and implemented, the regulations should not 
only provide an effective means of reducing and containing vulnerabilities 
(disaster mitigation), but also a means of facilitating reconstruction projects.  
This paper highlights the interrelated reconstruction challenges of allocation 
of responsibility for coordination, scarcity of resources and the application of 
legislation and regulations that were written for routine construction rather 
than post-disaster reconstruction. Examples of reconstruction following 
recent small scale disasters in New Zealand are presented to support the 
points raised. The paper concludes that whilst routine construction processes 
have proved adequate for small-scale disasters, the greater degree of 
coordination required for programmes of reconstruction following a larger 
disaster has not been adequately addressed in policy and legislation. 
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INTRODUCTION 
New Zealand invests heavily in relative terms, in research and development of 
disaster management plans. Government agencies such as the Ministry of Civil 
Defence and Emergency Management (MCDEM), Earthquake Commission (EQC), 
Institute of Geological and Nuclear Sciences Limited (GNS), and Resilient 
Organisations research programme funded by the Foundations for Research 
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Science and Technology, have current research objectives to address pressing 
disaster management needs. Though disaster management and the need to develop 
a resilient community capable of recovering from disasters has become topical, 
focus until recently has been mainly on reduction, readiness and response and 
Angus (2005) suggests that there is poor understanding of recovery and little 
consideration is given to the implications of recovery in New Zealand.  
In comparison to routine construction, there is little provision in several areas of 
legislation to cater for post-disaster reconstruction processes. Following a major 
disaster it is unlikely that coordinating authorities and regulatory bodies would be 
able to cope with the volume of work due to shortfalls in experienced personnel, thus 
the coordination and management of a major programme of reconstruction could 
become cumbersome and inefficient. 
THE RECOVERY FRAMEWORK 
The MCDEM in New Zealand encourages a holistic approach to the issue of 
recovery planning and believes this will be most effective if it is integrated with the 
remaining 3Rs of reduction, readiness and response. The definition of recovery 
encapsulates the expectations of recovery as “the coordinated efforts and processes 
to effect the immediate, medium and long-term holistic regeneration of a community 
following a disaster” (MCDEM 2005)  
Recovery requires a concerted approach that will support the foundations of 
community sustainability and capacity building and which will eventually reduce risks 
and vulnerabilities to future disasters. Jigyasu, (2004) describes an increase in 
vulnerability of local communities after the Latur 1993 earthquake in India, where 
sustainable recovery interventions were poorly planned and implemented. The 
rational starting point is the setting up of an institutional infrastructure for emergency 
management, which will formulate public policies for mitigation, response and 
recovery (Comerio 2004). These recovery policies should then be integrated into 
other emergency management areas as well as policies of sustainability and 
community capacity building (Coghlan 2004). New Zealand’s recovery planning and 
management arrangements are contained in the National Civil Defence Emergency 
Management Strategy (MCDEM 2004). Recovery is delivered through a continuum 
of central, regional, community and personal structures (Angus 2004). 
Management of recovery may involve an element of competition between central, 
regional and local levels of government for control of the process (Rolfe and Britton, 
1995). The MCDEM, together with cluster groups of agencies, coordinate planning at 
the central level. Regional and Territorial authorities are encouraged to produce 
group plans that will suit peculiar conditions of their local areas. Other discussion 
documents produced at the national level like Focus on Recovery: A holistic 
framework for recovery; and Recovery Planning both released in 2004, give context 
to recovery planning while the Civil Defence and Emergency Management Act 
(CDEMA) 2002 provides the legislation and the foundations for the New Zealand 
Civil Defence and Emergency Management (CDEM) environment. 
Legislation that applies to routine construction provides for the safe development of 
infrastructure, capital improvements and land use, ensuring preservation and 
environmental protection, however there appears to be little provision in several 
areas of legislation to facilitate reconstruction projects.  Much existing legislation was 
not drafted to cope with an emergency situation and was not developed to operate 
under the conditions that will inevitably prevail in the aftermath of a severe seismic 
event (Feast, 1995).  
Pieces of legislation that make reference to building work include, but are not 
restricted to the following: 
• Building Act 1991 and 2004 
• Resource Management Act 1992 
• Housing Improvement Regulations 1947 
• Historic Places Act 1993 
This paper will consider the problems associated with the implementation of some of 
these pieces of legislation particularly in relation to recovery, so as to gain insight 
into the appropriateness of the CDEM framework. 
THE RECOVERY PROCESS 
Recovery is an integral part of the comprehensive emergency management process 
(Sullivan 2003). It refers to all activities that are carried out immediately after the 
initial response to a disaster situation. This will usually extend until the community’s 
capacity for self-help has been restored. In other words, the end-state is when the 
assisted community reaches a level of functioning where it is able to sustain itself in 
the absence of further external intervention (Sullivan 2003). 
The effectiveness of the process will depend on how much planning has been 
carried out and what contingencies are provided for in preparing for the disaster. It is 
expected that recovery and reconstruction works will restore the affected community 
in all aspects of its natural, built, social and economic environment.  
The recovery process may present an opportunity for improvement in the functioning 
of the community, so that risk from future events can be reduced while the 
community becomes more resilient.  
Recovery is an enabling and supportive process, thus the heart of recovery is 
community participation. Consultation and communication is encouraged especially 
in identifying community needs and for collective decision making amongst all 
stakeholders. This way all stakeholders understand the process and their 
commitment towards agreed objectives is ensured. Typical stakeholders will include: 
• Asset owners (may be private or public and the business community) 
• Lifeline Agencies 
• CDEM groups (national, territorial and local government departments, police, fire 
brigade, relief and welfare agencies, health and safety personnel etc)  
• Insurance companies 
• Non-governmental agencies (charities, funding organisations etc.) 
• Construction and reinstatement organisations 
The recovery process will typically follow a conceptualised model (Figure 1) 
comprising five key stages (Brunsdon and Smith 2004) which are discussed below.  
• Impact Assessment - This is the information gathering stage in the recovery 
process aimed at gaining knowledge on the impact of the disaster event on 
individuals, community and the environment. It involves all stakeholders as it is at 
this stage that the necessary inspections and surveys (needs assessment) are 
carried out that will form the basis for all reinstatements activities. The needs 
assessments will include building inspections, insurances, and health and safety 
assessments. 
Success of this stage will depend on the levels of communication, consultation 
and planning between all stakeholders. The process must lend itself to reviews 
and updating to take account of new information at later stages. 
• Restoration Proposal - This is the stage where decisions are made on whether to 
repair, replace or abandon affected properties. These decisions are reached 
based on the input of the impact assessment activities. Realistic proposals for 
meeting the anticipated recovery task are presented for funding organisations 
consideration. 
• Funding Arrangements – in New Zealand affected parties may have access to 
two types of funds: funds from private insurance companies and from 
government. (Residential property owners are insured by the EQC, New 
Zealand’s primary provider of natural disaster insurance. EQC insures against 
damages caused by earthquake, natural landslips, volcanic eruption, 
hydrothermal activity, and tsunami). Secondary funding may come from charity 
organisations and external donor agencies.    
• Regulatory Process – design and regulatory approvals are sought for the 
reinstatement of damaged facilities. Processing of resource consents is usually 
painstaking and the target of approving authorities is to ensure that considerable 
level of resilience is incorporated in all developments. New knowledge gained on 
risk from hazards after the disaster will assist approving authorities to correct 
former design concepts to mitigate future disaster risk.  
• Physical Construction - This is the regeneration stage in the recovery process 
where every aspect of the community and its environment (natural, built, social 
and economic environments) return to normalcy. Experience has shown that it is 
difficult to return to the pre-event status quo but effort is made to restore the 
functions of the affected community. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
RECENT NATURAL DISASTERS 
In recent years there have been two locally significant disasters due to flooding 
events, at Manawatu in 2004 and Matata in 2005. The circumstances of these 
events are described briefly and some lessons learnt are summarised below. 
The Manawatu Flood 
Flooding in Manawatu was caused by heavy rain and gale force winds from the 14th 
to 23rd of February 2004. A Regional State of Civil Emergency was declared on 17th 
February. The flooding caused over 2,000 people to be evacuated from their homes 
at the height of the event. Many rivers breached their banks and considerable areas 
of farmland were inundated by silt and floodwaters. There was significant damage to 
infrastructure with damage to roads, bridges, and railways. In addition, there were 
telecommunication, power, gas and water supply outages to tens of thousands of 
people. Remarkably no lives were lost as a direct result of the event. 
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Figure 1: Key Stages in Recovery Process (Brunsdon and Smith 2004) 
Recovery costs are estimated at $160-180million for the rural sector and $120million 
for roads and council infrastructure. In addition $29.5 million and $3.5 million will be 
required to stop future flooding of the lower Manawatu and Rangitikei rivers 
respectively. 
The Matata Debris Flow 
A debris flow occurred on the 18th of May 2005 when a band of intense rain fell in the 
catchments behind Matata in the Bay of Plenty region. This triggered floods and 
several large debris flows.  
The highly erosive debris flows cleaned out the valley bottoms and destabilised the 
slopes along the channel, causing secondary landslides. The debris flows were 
structurally damaging to all buildings and bridges in their paths and at several 
locations the associated debris floods also were structurally damaging. 
In response to the Matata disaster a Civil Defence Emergency was declared on 18th 
May 2005 and this remained in place until the end of May. Total government 
valuation including land value and capital value of properties affected along the flood 
path hazard was estimated to be $9,740,000 for unsafe buildings and $2,937,000 for 
buildings subject to restricted use (WDC Recovery Report Nr. 06). 
 
Reconstruction following the floods 
Reconstruction was carried out through collaboration between CDEM agencies, local 
authorities, utility companies and insurance companies during recovery in the two 
cases. 
For the Manawatu-Wanganui region recovery was coordinated through the regional 
council’s new CDEM Group arrangements under the provisions of the Civil Defence 
Emergency Management Act (CDEM Act) 2002. For the other territorial authorities 
the event was managed through their Civil Defence Act 1983 arrangements. The 
CDEM Act provides a structure appropriate for dealing with events such as the 
floods and did not introduce any structures or procedures that hindered authorities in 
dealing with the event. In Matata the state of emergency was extended to allow work 
to be completed on critical road access routes but still only lasted two weeks.  
The roading authorities did not diverge from normal legislation and regulations and 
building consents were sought and granted as usual. Road users were consulted 
and kept updated on reconstruction issues. 
A source of frustration for utility companies in the Manawatu flood event according to 
AELG (2005) was the time taken to develop an understanding with the Regional 
Council about emergency actions that would cover all situations under the Resource 
Management Act, rather than require a formal process for each activity. A particular 
issue arose when the Regional Council initially required that slip material should be 
disposed of in a designated landfill; subsequently they allowed a more pragmatic 
approach which meant that slip material could be moved and redeposited locally. 
The road funding authority, Transfund, should ideally become involved as early as 
possible following a disaster since Transfund has direct access to government funds. 
However this was not the case following the Manawatu floods and it is likely that 
more could have been done to secure certainty over funding in the early stages of 
recovery which would have helped with the physical works prioritisation process.  
Recovery at Matata relied heavily on Central Government funding since the local 
council had a small number of rate payers and insufficient funds to cover the 
recovery costs itself. Funding took some time to come through whilst government 
requested and were awaiting details of the costs. This frustrated the local population. 
Overall there was little difference between the normal building process and the 
reconstruction process, due to the fact that the disasters were of a relatively small 
scale. The parties normally involved during routine construction projects were also 
involved during the reconstruction and using existing relationships eased the 
process.  During the initial recovery stage local contractors volunteered their time, 
but this needed careful management. National scale contractors were a valuable 
source of resources, since they were able to use their networks to mobilise 
resources from the whole country. 
CHALLENGES FOR LARGER SCALE DISASTERS 
Coordination of reconstruction 
Whilst relying on routine processes proved adequate in many ways for these small-
scale disasters, a higher level of coordination and management would be needed for 
programmes of reconstruction following a larger disaster. CDEM agencies are 
provided with certain powers under the CDEM Act to direct reconstruction, however, 
these powers can only be exercised in a declared emergency situation. When a 
declaration is lifted, the designated Recovery Manager has no statutory power to 
direct resources for recovery. If they were to direct activities using powers under the 
Act the agency would become responsible for the oversight and management of 
those activities; since CDEM agencies do not generally have the resources and skills 
for these tasks, they are reluctant to take on such responsibility (AELG, 2005).  
Clearly there is still a need for coordination once a state of emergency ceases, and 
the responsibly for this is generally taken up by local authorities and insurance 
companies. 
EQC provides statutory funds to cover losses incurred by individual property owners 
as a result of natural disasters. This arrangement is clearly inefficient in a large-scale 
disaster and it has been suggested by Page (2005) for example, that bulk 
reconstruction contracts should be awarded by the EQC so as to relieve house 
owners from sourcing and managing the process. The EQC trialled a coordinated 
response to the Te Anau earthquake of 2003, using a large single contractor to 
coordinate and manage the recovery works on its behalf. The relatively small scale 
damage of this particular event did not allow definitive conclusions to be drawn on 
the benefits of such a coordinated approach, but coordination was clearly an 
improvement on the situation where individual property owners competed for the 
services of a limited number of building contractors. 
MCDEM Director’s Guidelines (2005) proposes a management structure for 
coordinating recovery and it recommends the setting up of various task groups to 
achieve recovery objectives. Under the ‘Built Environment Task Group’ are sub-task 
groups for various parts of the built environment. For example, the ‘Residential 
Housing Subtask Group’ would be responsible to:  
‘repair, reconstruct or relocate buildings – obtaining fast-track building and other 
consents, sufficient builders and materials, coordinating skilled trades and their work 
standards’ 
This is a very challenging responsibility for the task force to take on and does not 
appear to concur with what has happened in practice following recent disasters. 
Reconstruction resources 
 
The processing of building consents at the early stages of reconstruction and 
recovery after an event has been identified as a potential bottleneck. Access to 
normal resource levels will be unlikely and inevitably there will be shortages of 
qualified people to handle impact assessments and consent processing. A more 
flexible approach to the standard consent process would be necessary to expedite 
the process and help cope with the high volume of consent applications after a major 
disaster.  
 
In terms of overall human resources Page (2004) suggests that the construction 
industry could cope effectively with a medium sized disaster if the base work load 
was at an average level, but a large scale disaster coinciding with a high base load 
could require up to 180,000 additional construction industry workers (this is based on 
an event causing $10billion worth of damage in the Wellington region and with a 
base work load 7% higher than current levels). Hopkins, (2004) in a similar study 
estimates a combined resource requirement for reinstatement to be about $7.73 
billion. The National Civil Defence Emergency Management Plan, due to come into 
force in July 2006, acknowledges New Zealand may need to mobilise all nationally 
available resources because it has finite capacity and capability for response and 
recovery. 
 
 
 
 
Hazard and risk assessment 
The need for a focussed assessment of potential hazards after an event cannot be 
overemphasised as it will enable the determination of risk levels and put in place the 
mechanism for avoiding any increase in those risks by limiting future developments 
in those areas. 
The new Building Act (2004) requires that Territorial Authorities must not grant 
building consents on land subjected to natural hazards unless they can be protected 
from the hazard and, where waivers are granted, it requires that notices be placed 
on the land to indicate the risk of natural hazards they are exposed to. Implementing 
this Act will have far reaching implications on insurance claims as the Earthquake 
Commission Act indicates that the EQC is not liable to settle any claim where there 
is an identified large risk. Current revisions to the mapping of vulnerable natural 
disaster zones may prevent existing properties from being compensated at all. 
The CDEM Act is the only piece of legislation that requires specific identification of 
hazards by councils. However, the scope of this identification is limited to the 
hazards already identified through the Resource Management Act (RMA) process 
and for which building works have been undertaken in hazard zones. Hazard 
identification can only be inferred from other pieces of legislation such as the 
Building Act and RMA where in the course of discharging council duties, information 
concerning natural hazards is deemed collected.  
The implication of council’s inability to gather information on hazards is that 
development control outside recognised hazard zones are limited, thus the 
provisions of the various acts concerning land use cannot be effectively applied. For 
the incident at Matata, the extents of the flood and debris flow were outside known 
hazard zones.  
CONCLUSION 
The task of reconstruction after a major event can be an onerous challenge. It 
requires deliberate and coordinated efforts of all stakeholders for effective and 
efficient recovery of the affected community. The paper has shown that the issues 
surrounding the implementation of the pieces of legislation concerning reconstruction 
after a major disaster are complex and interrelated. Though the existing regulatory 
framework seems to point to the right direction, more issues have to be addressed in 
practice.  
Legislation cannot be used for purposes other than those for which it is intended and 
there appears to be little provision in several areas of legislation for post-disaster 
situations. These polices need to be revised before hand as hasty revisions during 
the course of reconstruction works do not provide the best solution to major disaster 
problems. 
Should the routine regulatory and legislative processes be followed after a major 
disaster it is unlikely that regulatory bodies would be able to cope with the volume of 
work.  
The conflicts in the interpretation of the different pieces of legislation need to be 
harmonised, whilst the roles and responsibilities of the various CDEM agencies and 
other stakeholders need to be made clear. The apparent division between those 
who, in practice, take responsibility for reconstruction and those who set policy and 
legislation create barriers that need to be overcome. Failing this, implementation of 
reconstruction works will be cumbersome in the event of a major disaster. 
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